Afghanistan Pres. Obama's Vietnam + Pakistan His Cambodia

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Focusing on --

(1) Newsweek's Cover Story for 2/9/2009 entiled "Obama's Vietnam" (posted here and under "Reference Materials" two sections below).

(2) "Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice" by David Galula - considered "The Bible" by US General David Patraeus and required reading at the US Army's Command and General Staff School - available at your local library or from Amazon.com for $26.95 + shipping (unfortunately, the price is currently quite high due to extraordinary current demand from the U.S. media).

(3) The movie "Charlie Wilson's War" (2007) starring Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts, Philip Seymour-Hoffman and Amy Adams about one US Congressperson's covert expulsion of the Russians from Afghanistan in the 1980's - which raises the obvious question of why we think we can be more successful than the Russians in subjugating Afghanistan.

(*) For extra credit, read "The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual" (2007) by David Patraeus which is surprisingly readable - available at your local library or from Amazon.com for $10.20 (new) or $8.50 (used) + shipping.
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johnkarls
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Joined: Fri Jun 29, 2007 8:43 pm

Afghanistan Pres. Obama's Vietnam + Pakistan His Cambodia

Post by johnkarls »

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Newsweek's Cover Story for 2/9/2009 on Afghanistan was titled "Obama's Vietnam."

I would propose that we study the article closely (it is posted below). Particularly now that Pres. Obama has begun his promised military "surge" in Afghanistan -- announcing last week the doubling of American troops in Afghanistan from 17 thousand to 34 thousand.

Especially in conjunction with the decision of the Pakistani Government this past week to let the Tribal Regions & Swat Valley -- the home of Al Qaeda -- to, in effect, secede from Pakistan (a 2/16/2009 NY Times article on the subject is also posted below). The obvious comparison to Cambodia during the Vietnam War is evoked since rarely does a 24-news cycle pass these days without reports of attacks by US drones in this region.

We should also show just before our regular 7:00 pm > 8:45 pm discussion of this topic the recent movie "Charlie Wilson's War" starring Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts and Amy Adams. It is the story of how a US Congressperson (played by Tom Hanks) was able to covertly finance the Afghan Mujahideen ("Holy Warriers") to defeat and expel the Russians in the 1980's. WHICH RAISES THE OBVIOUS QUESTION OF WHY WE THINK WE (WITH LUKEWARM SUPPORT FROM NATO) CAN BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN SUBJUGATING AFGHANISTAN, PARTICULARLY IF THE TALIBAN IS OPERATING FROM "SAFE HAVENS" IN PAKISTAN.

I will try to find a suitable book on "lessons learned" from Vietnam (I am guessing that Gen. David Patreus wrote the definitive work on the subject).

johnkarls
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Text of Newsweek Cover Story - "Obama's Vietnam"

Post by johnkarls »

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NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE 2/9/2009 COVER STORY: AFGHANISTAN
Obama’s Vietnam
The analogy isn't exact. But the war in Afghanistan is starting to look disturbingly familiar.

By John Barry and Evan Thomas | NEWSWEEK
Published Jan 31, 2009
From the magazine issue dated Feb 9, 2009

About a year ago, Charlie Rose, the nighttime talk-show host, was interviewing Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the military adviser at the White House coordinating efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "We have never been beaten tactically in a fire fight in Afghanistan," Lute said. To even casual students of the Vietnam War, his statement has an eerie echo. One of the iconic exchanges of Vietnam came, some years after the war, between Col. Harry Summers, a military historian, and a counterpart in the North Vietnamese Army. As Summers recalled it, he said, "You never defeated us in the field." To which the NVA officer replied: "That may be true. It is also irrelevant."

Vietnam analogies can be tiresome. To critics, especially those on the left, all American interventions after Vietnam have been potential "quagmires." But sometimes clichés come true, and, especially lately, it seems that the war in Afghanistan is shaping up in all-too-familiar ways. The parallels are disturbing: the president, eager to show his toughness, vows to do what it takes to "win." The nation that we are supposedly rescuing is no nation at all but rather a deeply divided, semi-failed state with an incompetent, corrupt government held to be illegitimate by a large portion of its population. The enemy is well accustomed to resisting foreign invaders and can escape into convenient refuges across the border. There are constraints on America striking those sanctuaries. Meanwhile, neighboring countries may see a chance to bog America down in a costly war. Last, there is no easy way out.

True, there are important differences between Afghanistan and Vietnam. The Taliban is not as powerful or unified a foe as the Viet Cong. On the other hand, Vietnam did not pose a direct national-security threat; even believers in the "domino theory" did not expect to see the Viet Cong fighting in San Francisco. By contrast, while not Taliban themselves, terrorists who trained in Afghanistan did attack New York and Washington in 2001. Afghanistan has always been seen as the right and necessary war to fight—unlike, for many, Iraq. Conceivably, Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the successful surge in Iraq and now, as the head of Central Command in charge of the fight in Afghanistan, could pull off another miraculous transformation.

Privately, Petraeus is said to reject comparisons with Vietnam; he distrusts "history by analogy" as an excuse not to come to grips with the intricacies of Afghanistan itself. But there is this stark similarity: in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, we may now be facing a situation where we can win every battle and still not win the war—at least not within a time frame and at a cost that is acceptable to the American people.

A wave of reports, official and unofficial, from American and foreign (including Afghan) diplomats and soldiers, present and former, all seem to agree: the situation in Afghanistan is bad and getting worse. Some four decades ago, American presidents became accustomed to hearing gloomy reports like that from Vietnam, although the public pronouncements were usually rosier. John F. Kennedy worried to his dying day about getting stuck in a land war in Asia; LBJ was haunted by nightmares about "Uncle Ho." In the military, now as then, there are a growing number of doubters. But the default switch for senior officers in the U.S. military is "can do, sir!" and that seems to be the light blinking now. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, when in doubt, escalate. There are now about 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The outgoing Bush administration and the incoming Obama administration appear to agree that the number should be twice that a year or so from now.

To be sure, even 60,000 troops is a long way from the half million American soldiers sent to Vietnam at the war's peak; the 642 U.S. deaths sustained so far pale in comparison to the 58,000 lost in Vietnam. Still, consider this: that's a higher death toll than after the first nine years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. And what is troubling is that no one in the outgoing or incoming administration has been able to say what the additional troops are for, except as a kind of tourniquet to staunch the bleeding while someone comes up with a strategy that has a chance of working. The most uncomfortable question is whether any strategy will work at this point.

It's still too early to say exactly what President Obama will do in Afghanistan. But there are some signs—difficult to read with certainty, yet nonetheless suggestive—that reality is sinking in, at least in some important corners of the new administration. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the one Bush cabinet holdover, worries that increasing the size of the U.S. military's footprint in Afghanistan will merely fan the locals' antipathy toward foreigners. "We need to be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan," he told a congressional committee last week. "My worry is that the Afghans come to see us as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. And then we are lost."

Vietnam, half a world away, seemed alien to many Americans and to Westerners generally. Afghanistan might as well be the moon. At least Vietnam had been a French colony, albeit a troubled one. Afghanistan resisted colonization, dispatching 19th-century British and 20th-century Russian soldiers with equal efficiency. "Afghanistan is not a nation, it is a collection of tribes," according to a Saudi diplomat who did not wish to publicly disparage a Muslim neighbor. In Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem government was seen as illegitimate because Diem was a Roman Catholic in a mostly Buddhist country and because it was propped up by the United States. In Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai's government was essentially created by the United States after local warlords, backed by American airpower, ousted the Taliban in 2001. (Karzai was elected in his own right in 2004, but at a time when he was clearly favored by America and faced no serious rivals.)

As in Diem's Vietnam, government corruption is epic; even Karzai says so. "The banks of the world are full of the money of our statesmen," he said last November. His former finance minister, Ashraf Ghani, rates his old government as "one of the five most corrupt in the world" and warns that Afghanistan is becoming a "failed, narco-mafia state." In a country where seven out of 10 citizens live on about a dollar a day, the average family each year must pay about $100 in baksheesh, or bribes (in Vietnam, this was known as "tea" or "coffee" money). Foreign aid is, after narcotics, the readiest source of income in Afghanistan. But it has been widely estimated that because of stealing and mismanagement in Kabul, the capital, less than half of the money actually finds its way into projects, and only a quarter of that makes it to the countryside, where 70 percent of the people live.

To Afghans now, as to Vietnamese then, the government is more often an arbitrary force to be feared than a benevolent protector. Ordinary Vietnamese lived with the fear of crossing someone more powerful, who could always turn them over to the Americans as an enemy sympathizer; a similar fear pervades Afghanistan now. When U.S. forces quickly crushed the Taliban after 9/11, many Afghans welcomed them, thinking the all-powerful Americans would transform their streets and schools and the economy. Now bitterness has set in. "What have the people of Afghanistan received from the Coalition?" asks Zamir Kabulov, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan. "They lived very poorly before, and they still live poorly—but sometimes they also get bombed by mistake."

Nation-building in Afghanistan may be a hopeless cause. Periods of peace under centralized rule have been few and far between. Violence has been the norm: in the 18th century a Persian king, Nadir Shah, suppressed a revolt and beheaded 6,500 tribesmen (chosen by lot). He stacked their heads in a pyramid—with one of the instigators of the revolt entombed inside. And the Saudi diplomat is right in this sense: especially across the Pashtun belt in southern Afghanistan, local leaders have traditionally held more sway than whoever's in power in Kabul. The Taliban may not be fighting in a nationalist cause per se, as the Viet Cong were. But they certainly are more local, better rooted than the U.S.-led coalition.

The basic mantra of counterinsurgency is "clear, hold and build." Clear the area of insurgents. Hold it so the insurgents cannot return. Build the civic works and government structures so that the community decides to back the government. That's a coherent approach. But while foreign troops can clear better than the Taliban, they simply can't hold as well. In fact, the Taliban are getting pretty good at counterinsurgency themselves—"clear, hold and build" is what they're doing across southern Afghanistan. Their strict brand of justice is appealing to some Afghans, who crave order and security. In some areas Taliban commanders have even relaxed some of their more unpopular dictates, allowing girls to go to school, for instance. Last month, the sober and respected International Council on Security and Development reported that the Taliban "now holds a permanent presence in 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent a year ago." They are moving in on Kabul; according to the ICOS report, "three of the four main highways in Kabul are now compromised by Taliban activity."

The Taliban also has one resource that the Viet Cong never enjoyed: a steady stream of income from Afghanistan's massive heroin trade. Afghan poppies produce roughly 93 percent of the world's opium. Although, nominally, eradication has been a high priority since 2004, poppy cultivation has more than doubled. Farmers can't be persuaded to switch to other crops unless they feel confident that the Taliban won't return to kill them as punishment. And besides, they'd need passable roads to move more legitimate crops to functioning markets. The Americans don't have anywhere near enough troops—their own or those of increasingly disillusioned NATO allies—to secure the roads and the farm areas. That's not only because of Afghanistan's size (similar to Texas), but also because of a failure of strategy reminiscent of Vietnam.

America has been trying to pacify Afghanistan essentially through a counterterrorist campaign. The consequence has been that some of the military's most valuable warriors—its Special Forces—have been largely misused. Most people think of Special Forces as jumping out of helicopters on secret and dangerous missions. Actually, until George W. Bush launched his Global War on Terror—and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave the Special Operations Command the lead role—their normal (and arguably more useful) mission was to train up the armies of developing countries. In Vietnam, the Green Berets were initially (and successfully) sent into the highlands to train indigenous tribesmen as guerrilla fighters.

After 1962, however, they were diverted to fruitless efforts to seal Vietnam's frontiers. Similarly, the Special Forces in Afghanistan have been used mostly as strike teams to go after Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders—or deployed along the 1,400-mile border in an effort to stop insurgents from Pakistan—rather than to train Afghanistan's own forces. "The development of Afghan security forces has been a badly managed, grossly understaffed and poorly funded mess," concluded Center for Strategic and International Studies analyst Anthony Cordesman in a briefing to Democratic congressional leaders in January. The United States didn't even seriously fund the development of Afghanistan's own forces until 2007.

Even now, America and its NATO allies have provided fewer than half the trainers the Afghans need; and many of those are unskilled. As a result, the Afghan Army is too small and too poorly trained to take over the counterinsurgency missions that constitute the real battle in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army is getting better, but slowly. U.S. commanders privately think it may be five years before most units are able to operate on their own. The Afghan police remain a disaster—leaving U.S. forces to fill the vacuum.

As in Vietnam, efforts to seal the frontier have failed. The Taliban, like the North Vietnamese, has depended crucially on supply routes and sanctuaries just over the border. Just as NVA units were able to slip up and down the Ho Chi Minh trail running through Laos, the Taliban can fade away into the mountains and over the border into the lawless regions of Pakistan. These safe havens give them an invaluable space in which to train and resupply. Taliban fighters are much more willing to return to the fight knowing that their families are parked safely in Pakistan, and that they themselves can retreat there if wounded. One Taliban commander based in Pakistan even gave his men five cell-phone numbers to call for help if they got shot fighting U.S. troops across the border, promising they'd be evacuated and treated quickly.

The Americans have to be careful about chasing after the Taliban into their sanctuaries. In Vietnam, American strategists worried about bringing Russia or China into the war if they bombed too freely in and around Hanoi (by, say, sinking a Russian freighter in Haiphong Harbor). In Pakistan, the Americans worry that a heavy-handed intervention could destabilize the government, a risky move in a country with nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis have shared intelligence on Qaeda targets—and have from time to time launched offensives against Pakistani Taliban fighters along the border—but meanwhile, members of the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, have formed covert alliances with some Afghan Taliban factions. The Pakistanis have a strategic interest in keeping Afghanistan—which has developed close ties to archenemy India—weak. Since many Pakistani leaders are convinced that America will eventually leave, they're covering their bets for the future.

In Vietnam, America worried about covert Russian and Chinese backing for the North Vietnamese (some would say too much). Here, Pakistan may not be the only country playing a double game. While neighboring Iran is predominantly Shiite, and has traditionally backed the Sunni Taliban's foes in the Northern Alliance, Tehran may also be the source of some of the more sophisticated IEDs turning up on the battlefield in Afghanistan. Certainly Iran has some interest in seeing the American forces on its border bleed a little. At times, though, the United States can seem like its own worst enemy in Afghanistan. Lacking enough troops, forced to cover vast areas, U.S. forces depend far too heavily on strikes by A-10s, F-15s, even B-1 bombers. In 2004, the U.S. Air Force flew 86 strike sorties against targets in Afghanistan. By 2007, the number was up to 2,926—and that doesn't count rocket or cannon fire from helicopters. U.S. commanders have become much more careful about collateral damage since Vietnam. There are no more "free fire zones" or Marines using Zippo lighters to torch villages. But innocents die in the most carefully planned raids, especially when the enemy cynically uses civilians as cover—as the Viet Cong did, and the Taliban does. Already, civilian casualties have climbed from 929 in 2006 to close to 2,000 in 2008, according to the United Nations. "When we kill innocents, especially women and children, you lose that village forever," says Thomas Johnson of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. In the dominant Pashtun tribe, revenge is a duty. Kill one Pashtun tribesman, sadly observes a U.S. Special Forces colonel who spoke anonymously to be more frank, and you make three more your sworn enemy.

This, then, is the mess that faces General Petraeus. He was a near–miracle worker in Iraq, and it may be that just as Lincoln eventually found Grant, Obama will have been lucky to inherit Petraeus. So far, Petraeus is not signaling a new grand strategy, instead letting various policy reviews go forward. A shrewd politician, he may be seeking to quietly educate the new president on the high cost and many years required to "win" in Afghanistan—if such a thing is even possible.

It is a sure bet that Petraeus will want to unify the different commands now muddling the situation in Afghanistan. (Divided command was a chronic problem in Vietnam, too.) Some soldiers report to the Special Operations Command, some to the regular military; some to the U.S. Central Command and some to NATO; and, within NATO, to their own national governments. There are some 37,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan but many are more concerned with "force protection"—not sustaining casualties—than seeking out and engaging the enemy.

Petraeus will work closely with Richard Holbrooke, a veteran diplomat who helped broker peace in the Balkans. Holbrooke is being sent by the State Department to coordinate the scattered and easily corrupted foreign-aid programs and to knock heads to make sure the diplomats, politicians and soldiers are on the same page. Holbrooke is a force of nature; still, he could wind up like Robert (Blowtorch Bob) Komer in Vietnam in the late 1960s —brilliant, capable and too late.

In some ways, there is no mystery to what must be done to fight a successful counterinsurgency. As Petraeus himself has said, the United States cannot kill its way to success. Foreign troops cannot defeat insurgents. Only local forces with popular support can do that. (A RAND study of 90 insurgencies since World War II showed that "governments defeated less than a third of the insurgencies when their competence was medium or low.") It is a good bet that Petraeus will want American soldiers to train local village militias to fight the Taliban. The catch is that the Soviets already tried this (nothing is really new in counterinsurgency) and failed. In Afghanistan, local warlords quickly turn to fighting each other. The local saying is that they can be rented, not bought. And who wants to kill a Taliban fighter if the result is a blood feud?

Americans are appropriately skeptical about the chances of success in Afghanistan. A recent NEWSWEEK Poll shows that while 71 percent of the people believe that Obama can turn around the cratering economy, only 48 percent think he can make progress in Afghanistan. Deploying a U.S. force of 60,000 will cost about $70 billion a year. Training and supporting the 130,000 to 200,000 troops required for a proper Afghan Army would take another decade and could cost at least $20 billion. Petraeus has consistently warned that Afghanistan will be "the longest campaign in the long war" against Islamic extremism. But it's far from clear that Americans have the appetite for such a commitment: after the economy, their top priority is health care (36 percent). Only 10 percent put Afghanistan at the top of their list, even fewer than nominate Iraq. If there is no real improvement on the ground, by the 2010 midterm elections, candidates for office may be decrying "Obama's war."

So why not just get out? As always, it's not so simple. If the Americans pull their troops out, the already shaky Afghan Army could collapse. (Once they lost U.S. air support, South Vietnamese troops sometimes refused to take the field and fight.) Afghanistan could well plunge into civil war, just as it did after the Soviets left in 1989. Already, the Pashtuns in the south regard the American-backed Tajiks who dominate Karzai's administration as the enemy. The winning side would likely be the one backed by Pakistan, which may end up being the Taliban—just as it was in the last civil war.

Some argue this wouldn't be such a bad outcome, if the Taliban could be bribed or persuaded to not let Al Qaeda set up terrorist training bases on Afghan territory. According to one senior Taliban leader, a former deputy minister in Mullah Mohammed Omar's government who would only speak anonymously, some Pakistani officials are urging the insurgents to do something like this now—in return for talks with the Americans. On the other hand, Islamabad could be playing with fire. Given the longstanding ties between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, a jihadist state on its border is a threat to Pakistan, too. And here, U.S. national-security interests definitely do come into play.

Some problems do not have a solution, or any good solution. Two studies of the Afghanistan mess cochaired by retired Marine Gen. Jim Jones, now President Obama's national-security adviser, asserted last year that America cannot afford to lose in Afghanistan. Who wants to be the American president who allows jihadists to claim that they defeated and drove out American forces? Daniel Ellsberg, the government contractor who leaked the Pentagon papers, used to say about Vietnam, "It was always a bad year to get out of Vietnam." The same is all too true for Afghanistan.

With Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai

johnkarls
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NYTimes - "Secession" of Al Qaeda Region from Pakistan

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NYTimes – 2/16/2009
Pakistan Makes a Taliban Truce, Creating a Haven
By JANE PERLEZ
Reporting was contributed by Ismail Khan from Peshawar, Pakistan; Pir Zubair Shah and Salman Masood from Islamabad; and Helene Cooper from Washington.

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The government announced Monday that it would accept a system of Islamic law in the Swat valley and agreed to a truce, effectively conceding the area as a Taliban sanctuary and suspending a faltering effort by the army to crush the insurgents.

The concessions to the militants, who now control about 70 percent of the region just 100 miles from the capital, were criticized by Pakistani analysts as a capitulation by a government desperate to stop Taliban abuses and a military embarrassed at losing ground after more than a year of intermittent fighting. About 3,000 Taliban militants have kept 12,000 government troops at bay and terrorized the local population with floggings and the burning of schools.

The accord came less than a week before the first official visit to Washington of the Pakistani army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to meet Obama administration officials and discuss how Pakistan could improve its tactics against what the American military is now calling an industrial-strength insurgency there of Al Qaeda and the Taliban militants.

The militants have also made deep gains in neighboring Afghanistan, where the United States is sending more troops.

Pakistani government officials insisted the truce with the Taliban and the switch to the Shariah, the Islamic legal code, were consistent with the Constitution and presented no threat to the integrity of the nation.

But the truce offered by the Taliban, and accepted by the authorities, rebuffed American demands for the Pakistani civilian and military authorities to stick with the fight against the militants, not make deals with them.

Under the terms of the accord, the chief minister of the province, Amir Haider Khan Hoti, said that Pakistani troops would now go on “reactive mode” and fight only in retaliation for an attack.

Announced by the government of the North-West Frontier Province after consultation with President Asif Ali Zardari, the pact echoed previous government accords with the militants across Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal areas in North and South Waziristan.

Those regions have since become a mini-state for Qaeda and Taliban militants, who are now the focus of missile strikes by remotely piloted American aircraft. On Monday, what was thought to be a drone strike in Kurram, a separate area close to the Afghan border, killed 31 people, Pakistani intelligence officials said.

Analysts are now suggesting that the drone strikes may be pushing the Taliban, and even some Qaeda elements, out of the tribal belt and into Swat, making the valley more important to the Taliban.

Speaking in India on the last leg of his trip to Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, the Obama administration’s special envoy to the region, Richard C. Holbrooke, did not address the truce directly but said the turmoil in Swat served as a reminder that the United States, Pakistan and India faced an “enemy which poses direct threats to our leadership, our capitals, and our people.”

Pakistani legal experts and other analysts warned that the decision by the authorities would embolden militants in other parts of the country.

“This means you have surrendered to a handful of extremists,” said Athar Minallah, a leader of a lawyers’ movement that has campaigned for an independent judiciary. “The state is under attack; instead of dealing with them as aggressors, the government has abdicated.”

Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords,” a book on the Pakistani military, said that with the accord, “the government is ceding a great deal of space” to the militants.

But some Pakistani officials have recently argued that a truce was necessary in Swat because the army was unable to fight a guerrilla insurgency and civilians were suffering in the conflict.

A former interior minister, Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, told the parliamentary committee on national security this month that Shariah ordinances should be introduced to “calm the situation.”

Sherry Rehman, the government information minister, said the deal should not be seen as a concession. “It is in no way a sign of the state’s weakness,” she said. “The public will of the population of the Swat region is at the center of all efforts, and it should be taken into account while debating the merits of this agreement.”

In legislative elections a year ago, the people of Swat, a region that is about the size of Delaware and has 1.3 million residents, voted overwhelmingly for the secular Awami National Party. Since then, the Taliban have singled out elected politicians with suicide bomb attacks and chased virtually all of them from the valley. Several hundred thousand residents have also fled the fighting.

Many of the poor who have stayed in Swat, which until the late 1960s was ruled by a prince, were calling for the Shariah courts as a way of achieving quick justice and dispensing with the long delays and corruption of the civil courts. The authorities in the North-West Frontier Province, which includes Swat, argued that the Shariah courts were not the same as strict Islamic law. The new laws, for instance, would not ban education of females or impose other strict tenets espoused by the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The new accord, they said, would simply activate laws already agreed to by Benazir Bhutto in the early 1990s when she was prime minister. Similarly, the principle of Shariah courts in Swat was also agreed to by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. In both cases, the courts, though approved, were never put in place.

A Pakistani official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the official did not have permission to speak publicly, said that the government’s acceptance of the courts was an attempt to blunt efforts of the Taliban to woo Swat residents frustrated by the ineffective judiciary.

“The Taliban was trying to take advantage of the local movement and desire for a judicial system,” the official said. The official insisted that the Obama administration, informed of the accord, “showed understanding of our strategy.”

On Monday, a White House spokesman, Tommy Vietor, said only, “We have seen the press reports and are in touch with the government of Pakistan about the ongoing situation in Swat.”

Provincial officials said the accord in Swat was struck with Maulana Sufi Muhammad. He is the father-in-law of Maulana Fazlullah, a deputy to Baitullah Mehsud, who is the head of the umbrella group for the Taliban in Pakistan.

Mr. Muhammad is often described as more benign than his son-in-law, but the ranks of their followers and their lines of authority are fluid and overlapping.

In 2001, he took thousands of young men across the border into Afghanistan to fight jihad against the Americans. After his return he was imprisoned by Pakistani authorities.

He was released last April after agreeing to denounce violence and work to bring peace to the area.

Despite the insistence that the new legal system in Swat was consistent with existing civil law, some feared that the accord was an ominous sign of the power of the militants to spread into the heartland of Pakistan, including the most populous and wealthiest province, the Punjab.

“The hardest task for the government will be to protect the Punjab against inroads by militants,” wrote I. A. Rehman, a member of the Human Rights Commission, in the daily newspaper, Dawn.

“Already, religious extremists have strong bases across the province and sympathizers in all arenas: political parties, services, the judiciary, the middle class, and even the media,” he wrote. “For its part, the government is handicapped because of its failure to offer good governance, guarantee livelihoods, and restore people’s faith in the frayed judicial system.”

johnkarls
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Def Sec Gates: Pakistan Safe Havens Pivotal Re Afghanistan

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Meet the Press – March 1, 2009
Defense Secretary Gates Interview
Transcript Excerpt Re Afghanistan


EDITORIAL NOTE – Note well Sec Gates’ last two sentences in his first response re the Pakistan “safe havens” vis-à-vis Afghanistan = “AFTER ALL, 20 YEARS AGO I WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT BORDER AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA FIGHTING THE SOVIETS, AND WE HAD THE SAFE HAVEN IN PAKISTAN. AND LET ME TELL YOU, IT MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE."


MR. GREGORY: I want to turn to Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have said that in fact the greatest military challenge now is Afghanistan. The president has said that he will commit 17,000 additional U.S. troops. This is how you described Afghanistan recently: "This is going to be a long slog," you said, "and frankly, my view is that we need to be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan." That was in January. Back in December you said about Pakistan that it is on top of the list when it comes to problems and challenges that the U.S. faces. Now, most of the security risk is posed from that border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan where jihadists and the Taliban are resurgent. In that area, and as you look at the whole picture, what worries you most?

SEC'Y GATES: I think it's the safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border not just for al-Qaeda, but for the Taliban, for the Haqqani network, for Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and these other affiliated groups that are all working together. They're into--they're separate groups, but they're all working together. And, and I think as long as, as they have a safe haven to operate there, it's going to be a problem for us in Afghanistan. After all, 20 years ago I was on the other side of that border as deputy director of CIA fighting the Soviets, and we had the safe haven in Pakistan. And let me tell you, it made a big difference.

MR. GREGORY: Is it sustainable, this policy of covert operations targeting the Taliban and other jihadists through covert measures, at a time--and doing so, as I say, through covert measures at a time when, when the Pakistani leadership thinks it's destabilizing the country?

SEC'Y GATES: I'm not going to get into any intelligence operations. I will just say that I think that the key here is our being able to cooperate with and enable the Pakistanis to be able to deal with this problem on their own sovereign territory. I believe, based on my talks with the Pakistanis here in Washington this week, this past week, that, that they have--they clearly now understand that what's going on up there in that border area is as big a risk to the stability of Pakistan as it is a problem for us in Afghanistan.

MR. GREGORY: The, the overall consequence--the trouble and consequences of, of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential. True?

SEC'Y GATES: Well, as long as we're in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven...

MR. GREGORY: Mm-hmm.

SEC'Y GATES: ...from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be, can be put together. So that border area, particularly on the Pakistani side, is, is the most worrisome

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you specifically about Afghanistan. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in The Washington Post Thursday about what the U.S. strategy has been up until now: "To create," he says, "a, a central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society. That strategy cannot succeed in Afghanistan." How does the strategy have to change in Afghanistan?

SEC'Y GATES: I--first of all, we're reviewing exactly that in the administration right now. That's what the Pakistanis and the Afghans were in town for was to participate in that review. We're talking to the Europeans, to our allies, we're bringing in an awful lot of people to get different points of view as we go through this, this review of what our strategy ought to be. And I often get asked, well, how long will those 17,000 be there? Will more go in? All that depends on the outcome of, of this strategy review that I hope will be done in a few weeks.

johnkarls
Posts: 2034
Joined: Fri Jun 29, 2007 8:43 pm

Recommended Books to Read

Post by johnkarls »

.
I have now read David Patraeus' Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which is apparently his only published writing on counter-insurgency according to Amazon.com.

Though excellent, it should be accompanied by another work to give it perspective.

I have also now read other books on Patraeus' Field Manual and believe they lack perspective because they were all written before the outcome of the "surge" in Iraq began to take shape.

However, excellent perspective on guerilla warfare is available in David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" (1964) which is available in paparback. David Galula (1919-1967) was a French military officer who fought against the Algerian guerillas who achieved independence and studied extensively the guerilla wars of Greece, the Philippines and Indochina (Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos -- both the French and later the American involvement).

I would recommend we read both Patraeus and Galula.

**************************************************************************************************************************************************
David Galula
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

David Galula (1919-1967) was a French military officer and scholar. He was influential in developing theories of counterinsurgency.

Gallula obtained his baccalauréat in Casablanca,[2] and graduated from the École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr in promotion no 126 of 1939-1940.

In 1941, he was expelled from the corps of the officers, in accordance to the Statute on Jews of the Vichy State. After living in North Africa, he joined the I Corps of the Army of the Liberation, and served during the Liberation of France, receiving a wound during the battle for Elba in June 1944.

In 1945, Galula departed for China, where he became assistant military attaché in the French embassy in Beijing, and witnessed the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1948, he took part in the United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans during the Greek Civil War. From 1952 to February 1956, he served as military attaché in the French embassy of Hong Kong. He visited the Philippines, and studied the Indochina War without taking part in it.

From August 1956 to April 1958, Galula, then a captain, lead the 3rd Company of the 45th Bataillon d'Infanterie Coloniale during the Algerian War. He distinguished himself by applying personal tactics in counterinsurgency to his sector of Kabylie, at Djebel Mimoun,[3] near Tigzirt, effectively pacifying his sector and earning accelerated promotion from this point.

In 1958, Galula was transferred to the Headquarters of National Defence in Paris. He gave a series of conferences abroad and attended the Armed Forces Staff College.

In 1962, Galula resigned his commission to study in the United States, where he obtained a position of research associate at the Centre for International Affairs of Harvard University. He wrote his experiences in two books, later published by the RAND Corporation: Pacification in Algeria in 1963, and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice in 1964.[4] His books analyse his experiences of Indochina, Greece and Algeria, giving a taxonomy of favourable and unfavourable settings for a revolutionary war from the point of view of the loyalist or revolutionary forces. Galula cites Mao Zedong with "revolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military", and proposes four "laws" for order enforcement:[5]

1. The aim of the war is support of the population rather than control of territory.
2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the mass can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
3. Support of the population can be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.
4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to win a neighbouring area.

He sums up the nature of the war as "building or rebuilding a political apparatus within the population".[6]
Galula has been considered to be an important military expert by contemporary defence experts.[7][8] Notably, the US Military give his experiences as examples in the context of the Iraq War[9][10][11][12] and he is often quoted in the US Army's Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice is a mandatory reading for students of the Command and General Staff College.[13]

Books

· Psi Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Napolean D. Valeriano, George K. Tanham, Charles T. R. Bohannan, Praeger Security International, 1968, ISBN 0275993108
· Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, David Galula, RAND Corporation, 2006, ISBN 0833039202
· Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, ISBN 0275993035
· Les Moustaches du tigre, Flammarion, 1965 (under the pseudonyme of Jean Caran), ISBN 2080500864

References

1. ^ (French) • "CONTRE-INSURRECTION : Théorie et pratique", Centre de Doctrine de l'Emploi des Forces
2. ^ Greenwood Publishing
3. ^ Théâtre des opérations
4. ^ "FRENCH LESSONS - New York Post". Nypost.com. September 22, 2008. http://www.nypost.com/seven/04292007/po ... arlowe.htm. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
5. ^ "CRInfo - Book Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula". Crinfo.org. http://www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10672/. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
6. ^ "THÉÂTRE DES OPÉRATIONS: « CONTRE-INSURRECTION, THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE » PAR DAVID GALULA – UNE FICHE DE LECTURE COMMENTÉE". Reflexionstrategique.blogspot.com. vendredi 21 Marchs 2008. http://reflexionstrategique.blogspot.co ... tique.html. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
7. ^ http://www.maxwell.af.mil/info-ops/iosp ... cullen.pdf
8. ^ http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/downl ... IVERED.doc
9. ^ "A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass". Oai.dtic.mil. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRec ... =ADA436240. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
10. ^ "Fighting a Global Insurgency Utilizing Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory". Oai.dtic.mil. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRe ... =ADA467236. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
11. ^ "Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC)". Socpac.socom.mil. http://www.socpac.socom.mil/reading/?se ... d%20Galula. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
12. ^ "PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Winter 2007-08". Carlisle.army.mil. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARA ... derson.htm. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.
13. ^ "U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Deputy Commandant's Deploying Officer Reading List". Cgsc.army.mil. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... oylist.asp. Retrieved on 2008-09-22.

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