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Text of the Report - p. 1

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WORLD AT RISK

The Report of the Commission on the Prevention
of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism



WORLD AT RISK


The Report of the Commission on the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation
and Terrorism

Bob Graham, Chairman

Jim Talent, Vice-Chairman

Graham Allison . Robin Cleveland
Steve Rademaker . Tim Roemer
Wendy Sherman . Henry Sokolski
Rich Verma



vintage books

A Division of Random House, Inc.
New York




First Vintage Books Edition: December 2008

All rights reserved

THE AUTHORIZED EDITION of the World at Risk: The
Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD
Proliferation and Terrorism is published in the
United States by Vintage Books, a division of
Random House, Inc., New York, and in Canada by
Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.


ISBN: 978-0-307-47326-4


www.vintagebooks.com


www.preventwmd.gov


Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
First Edition




Contents

Letters of Transmittal vi
Preface xi
Executive Summary xv

one

Biological and Nuclear Risks 1

two

Findings and Recommendations 21

Biological Proliferation and Terrorism 23
Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism 43
Pakistan: The Intersection of Nuclear Weapons and

Terrorism 65
Russia and the United States 76
Government Organization and Culture 82
The Role of the Citizen 107

Appendices

Review of Implementation of the Baker-Cutler Report 113
International Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation

Treaties, Regimes, and Initiatives 122
Acronyms and Abbreviations 126
Commissioner Biographies 128
Commission Staff 132



December 2, 2008

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), we hereby submit the report of
the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism.

The mandate given to this Commission by Congress was far-
reaching. We were given a charter to assess, within 180 days, any and all
of the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of
mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. We were also asked to provide concrete recommendations—a road map, if you will—to address
these threats.

In response, we brought together a staff of more than two dozen
professionals and subject matter experts from across the national security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. We interviewed
more than 250 government officials and nongovernmental experts. We
held eight major commission meetings and one public hearing.

Our research encompassed travel from the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico to London to Vienna. We traveled to Moscow to
assess U.S. nuclear cooperation initiatives with Russia. We were en
route to Pakistan, a country of particular interest to this Commission and
to the United States, only to hear that the bombing of the Marriott Hotel
in Islamabad had occurred. We had been hours from staying in that very
hotel.

Ultimately, we opted to center the Commission findings on several
areas where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads



of terrorism and proliferation in the poorly governed parts of Pakistan,
the prevention of biological and nuclear terrorism, and the potential
erosion of international nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter
a nuclear energy renaissance.

The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the
American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to
fully adapt to these circumstances, and to convey the sobering reality
that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our
margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

We thank you for the honor of allowing us to serve our country in
this task. Our Commission and staff stand ready to help you in any way
possible to explore and weigh the findings and recommendations contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,
Senator Bob Graham Senator Jim Talent
Chairman Vice-Chairman

Dr. Graham T. Allison Ms. Robin Cleveland
Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker The Honorable Timothy J. Roemer


Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman Mr. Henry D. Sokolski


Mr. Richard Verma



December 2, 2008

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi The Honorable John A. Boehner
United States House of Representatives United States House of Representatives
235 Cannon House Office Building 1011 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Harry Reid The Honorable Mitch McConnell
United States Senate United States Senate
528 Hart Senate Office Building 361-A Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Speaker Pelosi, Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader Boehner, and
Minority Leader McConnell:

In accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), we hereby submit the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism.

The mandate given to this Commission by Congress was far-reaching.
We were given a charter to assess, within 180 days, any and all of the
nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. We were also asked to provide concrete
recommendations—a road map, if you will—to address these threats.

In response, we brought together a staff of more than two dozen professionals and subject matter experts from across the national security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. We interviewed more than 250
government officials and nongovernmental experts. We held eight major commission meetings and one public hearing.

Our research encompassed travel from the Sandia National Laboratory in
New Mexico to London to Vienna. We traveled to Moscow to assess U.S.
nuclear cooperation initiatives with Russia. We were en route to Pakistan, a
country of particular interest to this Commission and to the United States,



only to hear that the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad had
occurred. We had been hours from staying in that very hotel.

Ultimately, we opted to center the Commission findings on several areas
where the risks to the United States are increasing: the crossroads of terrorism
and proliferation in the poorly governed parts of Pakistan, the prevention of
biological and nuclear terrorism, and the potential erosion of international
nuclear security, treaties, and norms as we enter a nuclear energy renaissance.

The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to
these circumstances, and to convey the sobering reality that the risks are
growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

We thank you for the honor of allowing us to serve our country in this
task. Our Commission and staff stand ready to help you in any way possible to
explore and weigh the findings and recommendations contained in this report.

Respectfully submitted,
Senator Bob Graham Senator Jim Talent
Chairman Vice-Chairman

Dr. Graham T. Allison Ms. Robin Cleveland
Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker The Honorable Timothy J. Roemer


Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman Mr. Henry D. Sokolski


Mr. Richard Verma



Preface

During the course of our fieldwork for this report, the members of the
Commission had a near miss—and it served as a reminder of the
urgency of our mission and message.

Asked by Congress to recommend ways of preventing weapons of
mass destruction proliferation and terrorism, we were on our way to a
place where these two concerns intersect—Pakistan. On September
20, 2008, we were in Kuwait City awaiting our connecting flight to
Islamabad, where we would be staying at the Marriott Hotel. Suddenly
our cell phones began buzzing with breaking news: the Islamabad
Marriott had just been devastated by a bomb.

Minutes later, every television set in the airport was showing live
footage of our destination. The Marriott was ablaze, a line of fire running its length. The hotel front was a mass of twisted iron and broken
concrete. What once had been the lobby was now a huge black crater.
More than fifty people lost their lives that day at the Islamabad Marriott, a gathering place for prominent visitors and influential locals.
Within hours, the attack came to be known as Pakistan’s 9/11—a frightening reminder that we live in an age of global terrorism.

The world is also imperiled by a new era of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Our Commission was charged with recommending ways of halting and reversing this proliferation. We focused
on two categories of WMD—nuclear and biological weapons—because
they pose the greatest peril.

The proliferation of these weapons increases the risk that they may
be used in a terrorist attack in two ways. First, it increases the number
of states that will be in a position either to use the weapons themselves
or to transfer materials and know-how to those who might use WMD
against us. The more proliferation that occurs, the greater the risk of

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Preface

additional proliferation, as nations that have to this point declined to
acquire nuclear weapons will believe it necessary to counter their
neighbors who have developed those capabilities. Second, it increases
the prospect that these weapons will be poorly secured and thus may be
stolen by terrorists or by others who intend to sell them to those who
would do us harm.

Terrorists are determined to attack us again—with weapons of
mass destruction if they can. Osama bin Laden has said that obtaining
these weapons is a “religious duty” and is reported to have sought to
perpetrate another “Hiroshima.”

Our Commission is a legacy of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (the 9/11 Commission). The reports produced by
these commissions explained to the American people how and why the

U.S. government failed to discover that terrorists, operating from
Afghanistan, were infiltrating the United States in order to use a most
unconventional resource—commercial airplanes—as weapons that
would kill thousands of people. We have a far different mandate: to
examine the threats posed to the United States by weapons of mass
destruction proliferation and terrorism in a world that has been changed
forever by the forces of globalization.
The United States still wields enormous power of the traditional
kind, but traditional power is less effective than it used to be. In today’s
world, individuals anywhere on the planet connect instantly with one
another and with information. Money is moved, transactions are made,
information is shared, instructions are issued, and attacks are unleashed
with a keystroke. Weapons of tremendous destructive capability can be
developed or acquired by those without access to an industrial base or
even an economic base of any kind, and those weapons can be used to
kill thousands of people and disrupt vital financial, communications,
and transportation systems, which are easy to attack and hard to defend.
All these factors have made nation-states less powerful and more vulnerable relative to the terrorists, who have no national base to defend
and who therefore cannot be deterred through traditional means.

One of the purposes of this report is to set forth honestly and
directly, for the consideration of the American people, the threat our
country faces if terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction. We also

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Preface

present recommendations of actions that the United States can undertake—unilaterally and in concert with the international community—
to make our homeland and the world safer.

Though our recommendations are primarily addressed to the next
President and the next Congress, we also envision an important role for
citizens. We want to inform our fellow citizens, and thereby empower
them to act. We call for a new emphasis on open and honest engagement between government and citizens in safeguarding our homeland
and in becoming knowledgeable about and developing coordinated
public responses to potential terrorist attacks.

In every terrorist strike anywhere in the world, to every innocent
life lost must be added thousands more who were just hours away from
having been at that ground zero, from having become innocent victims—a point powerfully underscored by the Commission’s near miss
on September 20, 2008. In those moments of danger, we are all, first
and foremost, citizens of a world at risk, with the common cause of protecting the innocent and preserving our way of life.

It is our hope to break the all-too-familiar cycle in which disaster
strikes and a commission is formed to report to us about what our government should have known and done to keep us safe. This time we do
know. We know the threat we face. We know that our margin of safety is
shrinking, not growing. And we know what we must do to counter the
risk. There is no excuse now for allowing domestic partisanship or international rivalries to prevent or delay the actions that must be taken. We
need unity at all levels—nationally, locally, and among people all across
the globe. There is still time to defend ourselves, if we act with the
urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us. Sounding that call for urgent action is the purpose of this report.

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Executive Summary

The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of
mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013.

The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to
be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.
The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move
more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and
reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.

Further compounding the nuclear threat is the proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities to new states and the decision by several
existing nuclear states to build up their arsenals. Such proliferation is a
concern in its own right because it may increase the prospect of military
crises that could lead to war and catastrophic use of these weapons. As
former Senator Sam Nunn testified to our Commission: “The risk of a
nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding.”

This Commission was chartered by Congress to assess our nation’s
progress in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and
terrorism—and to provide the next President and Congress with concrete, actionable recommendations that can serve as their road map to
a safer homeland and world.

No mission could be timelier. The simple reality is that the risks that
confront us today are evolving faster than our multilayered responses.
Many thousands of dedicated people across all agencies of our government are working hard to protect this country, and their efforts have had
a positive impact. But the terrorists have been active, too—and in our
judgment America’s margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

The Commission reached that sobering conclusion following six

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Executive Summary

months of deliberations, site visits, and interviews with more than 250
government officials and nongovernmental experts in the United States
and abroad.

While the mandate of the Commission was to examine the full
sweep of the challenges posed by the nexus of terrorist activity and the
proliferation of all forms of WMD—chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear—we concluded early in our deliberations that this report
should focus solely on the two types of WMD categories that have the
greatest potential to kill in the most massive numbers: biological and
nuclear weapons.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has spent billions
of dollars securing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union—to good effect—and has
introduced some new counterproliferation measures. But during that
period, the world has also witnessed a new era of proliferation: North
Korea tested a nuclear weapon; Iran has been rapidly developing capabilities that will enable it to build nuclear weapons; Dr. A. Q. Khan, of
Pakistan, led a nuclear proliferation network that was a one-stop shop
for aspiring nuclear weapons countries; and nuclear arms rivalries have
intensified in the Middle East and Asia. If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and even nuclear use at the very
time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce their
nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles.

Meanwhile, biotechnology has spread globally. At the same time that
it has benefited humanity by enabling advances in medicine and in agriculture, it has also increased the availability of pathogens and technologies that can be used for sinister purposes. Many biological pathogens and
nuclear materials around the globe are poorly secured—and thus vulnerable to theft by those who would put these materials to harmful use, or
would sell them on the black market to potential terrorists.

According to an April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on
Trends in Global Terrorism, “Activists identifying themselves as
jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing both in
number and geographic dispersion. . . . If this trend continues, threats
to U.S. interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading
to increasing attacks worldwide.” Since 9/11 there has been an increase
in the number of groups that have associated or aligned themselves with
al Qaeda—the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States and the

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Executive Summary

perpetrators of 9/11—including al Qaeda in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group, and the Algerian al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). This
increase in terrorist networks is a threat to the entire world.

Though U.S. policy and strategy have made progress, they have
not kept pace with the growing risks. In the area of counterterrorism,
our government has innovated and implemented new initiatives since
9/11, but its focus has been mainly limited to defense, intelligence, and
homeland security programs and operations. The next administration
needs to go much further, using the tools of “soft power” to communicate effectively about American intentions and to build grassroots
social and economic institutions that will discourage radicalism and
undercut the terrorists in danger spots around the world—especially in
Pakistan.

Biological Proliferation and Terrorism

Since terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the

U.S. government has addressed the risk of biological proliferation and
terrorism with policies rooted in a far different mind-set than the one
that guides its policies toward nuclear weapons. While U.S. strategies
to combat nuclear terrorism focus on securing the world’s stocks of fissile materials before terrorists can steal or buy enough on the black
market to build a nuclear bomb, the government’s approach to bioterrorism has placed too little emphasis on prevention. The Commission
believes that the United States must place a greater emphasis on the
prevention side of the equation.
To date, the U.S. government has invested the largest portion of its
nonproliferation efforts and diplomatic capital in preventing nuclear
terrorism. Only by elevating the priority of preventing bioterrorism
will it be possible to substantially improve U.S. and global biosecurity.

The nuclear age began with a mushroom cloud—and, from that
moment on, all those who worked in the nuclear industry in any capacity, military or civilian, understood they must work and live under a
clear and undeniable security mandate. But the life sciences community has never experienced a comparable iconic event. As a result,
security awareness has grown slowly, lagging behind the emergence of
biological risks and threats. It is essential that the members of the life

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Executive Summary

sciences community—in universities, medical and veterinary schools,
nongovernmental research institutes, trade associations, and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies—foster a bottom-up effort to
sensitize researchers to biosecurity issues and concerns.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing domestic measures to
prevent bioterrorism: (1) conduct a comprehensive review of
the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens,

(2) develop a national strategy for advancing bioforensic capabilities, (3) tighten government oversight of high-containment
laboratories, (4) promote a culture of security awareness in the
life sciences community, and (5) enhance the nation’s capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from
inflicting mass casualties.
°°°
The cornerstone of international efforts to prevent biological weapons
proliferation and terrorism is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). This treaty bans the development, production, and acquisition
of biological and toxin weapons and the delivery systems specifically
designed for their dispersal. But because biological activities, equipment,
and technology can be used for good as well as harm, BW-related activities are exceedingly difficult to detect, rendering traditional verification
measures ineffective. In addition, the globalization of the life sciences and
technology has created new risks of misuse by states and terrorists.

The BWC has been undercut by serious violations, which went
undetected for years, and by its failure to gain universal membership.
Moreover, the treaty is not supported at the international level by an
overarching strategy for preventing biological weapons proliferation
and terrorism.

Meanwhile, U.S. biological cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU) have made good progress in
improving pathogen security and in redirecting former bioweapons scientists to peaceful activities. In recent years, however, the Russian government has viewed such programs with disinterest and even suspicion
and has argued that its growing economic strength obviates the need for
continued foreign assistance. Bureaucratic and political obstacles in Rus

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Executive Summary

sia have forced the United States to reluctantly cut back its biological
CTR activities there. The security of pathogen collections in Russia has
been improved, but the large cadre of former bioweapons scientists
remains a global proliferation concern.

Although biological CTR programs have stalled in Russia, the

U.S. government has expanded them elsewhere. The program now
includes developing countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia that face significant risks from transnational terrorist
groups, have poorly secured biological laboratories and culture collections, and experience frequent outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. To prevent terrorists from stealing dangerous pathogens or
recruiting indigenous biological experts, the United States has helped
these countries upgrade laboratory security, has provided biosecurity
training, and has engaged hundreds of life scientists in peaceful research
projects. These efforts are ongoing, and it remains to be seen if they
will be successful. Other parts of the developing world, including Africa
and South America, face serious biosecurity challenges and could benefit from similar cooperative threat reduction programs.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and
terrorism: (1) press for an international conference of countries
with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity, (2)
conduct a global assessment of biosecurity risks, (3) strengthen
global disease surveillance networks, and (4) propose a new
action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective
national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, for adoption at the next review conference in 2011.

Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism

The number of states that are armed with nuclear weapons or are seeking to develop them is increasing. Terrorist organizations are intent on
acquiring nuclear weapons or the material and expertise needed to
build them. Trafficking in nuclear materials and technology is a serious,
relentless, and multidimensional problem.

Yet nuclear terrorism is still a preventable catastrophe. The world

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Executive Summary

must move with new urgency to halt the proliferation of nuclear
weapons nations—and the United States must increase its global leadership efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguard nuclear material before it falls into the hands of terrorists. The
new administration must move to revitalize the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The nonproliferation regime embodied in the NPT has been
eroded and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s financial
resources fall far short of its existing and expanding mandate. The
amount of safeguarded nuclear bomb-making material has grown by a
factor of 6 to 10 over the past 20 years, while the agency’s safeguards
budget has not kept pace and the number of IAEA inspections per
facility has actually declined.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The United States should work
internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation
regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons by (1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of
proof to the state under review for noncompliance; (2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive
fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international obligations; (3) strengthening the International
Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to
its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the
resources and authorities needed to meet its current and
expanding mandate; (4) promoting the further development
and effective implementation of counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; (5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and
North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium-
reprocessing capability; (6) working in concert with others to
do everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium
on nuclear testing; (7) working toward a global agreement on
the definition of “appropriate” and “effective” nuclear security
and accounting systems as legally obligated under United

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Executive Summary

Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and (8) discouraging, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the
promotion of civil nuclear power.

°°°
The United States and Russia together possess about 95 percent of the
world’s nuclear material. This fact has led the United States to work
closely with Russia to make sure that all of this material is safe from
theft and that Russia’s former WMD scientists find employment outside of the nuclear military complex. The United States has spent billions of dollars securing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in
Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union. Now Russia is a full
partner and the two countries must work together to help other states
improve their nuclear security and safety.

Cooperative nuclear security programs, part of the overall effort
by the United States to address proliferation and WMD terrorist
threats, can be better utilized. To date, such cooperative programs
have focused on Russia. Although there is more to do there, the next
President should build on work already under way to involve all nations
in the fight against proliferation and WMD terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security
programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts
for the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and
recipient to a cooperative partnership.

°°°
The Commission focused with special urgency on the pressing nuclear
proliferation designs of two nations, one with ties to terrorists and both
with records of weapons proliferation: Iran and North Korea. The
Commission believes strongly that the United States, together with
other nations, must develop the right combination of incentives and
disincentives to address these problem cases. The Commission views
the nation’s fundamental objectives as clear and compelling: Iran must
cease all of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons; North Korea must
dismantle its nuclear program. Smart diplomacy requires that any

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Executive Summary

approach be coupled with the credible threat of direct action to ensure
we meet these objectives.

Iran continues to defy its NPT obligations, UN Security Council
resolutions, and the international community in an apparent effort to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It has 3,850 centrifuges spinning
and more than 1,000 pounds of enriched uranium—three-quarters of
what would be needed, after further enrichment, to build its first
bomb.

Meanwhile, there has been at least some progress in the international efforts to convince North Korea to roll back its nuclear program. The February 2007 Six-Party Agreement on a concrete
denuclearization plan was a first step toward the realization of a nonnuclear Korean peninsula. After months of glacial diplomatic movement, progress has recently been made on framing the verification
issues. However, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang will ultimately carry out its commitment to eliminate its nuclear weapons and
associated enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Experts say that
North Korea now has about 10 bombs’ worth of plutonium and it has
conducted a nuclear test.

The Commission decided that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the precise tactics that
should be employed by the next administration to achieve the strategic
objective of stopping the nuclear weapons programs of these two countries. Developing those tactical initiatives will clearly be one of its
urgent priorities.

But on the central finding, the Commission was unanimous in concluding that the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose
immediate and urgent threats to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Successful nuclear programs in both countries could trigger a cascade
of proliferation and lead to the unraveling of the NPT.

RECOMMENDATION 5: As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons
programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation of all of Iran’s nuclear weapons–related efforts. In the case
of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and
dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next administration seeks to stop

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Executive Summary

these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the
Iranian and North Korean governments, it must do so from a
position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits to them of
abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the enormous
costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must be backed by the
credible threat of direct action in the event that diplomacy fails.

Pakistan: The Intersection of Nuclear
Weapons and Terrorism


Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all
roads would intersect in Pakistan. It has nuclear weapons and a history
of unstable governments, and parts of its territory are currently a safe
haven for al Qaeda and other terrorists. Moreover, given Pakistan’s
tense relationship with India, its buildup of nuclear weapons is exacerbating the prospect of a dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia that
could lead to a nuclear conflict.

Pakistan is an ally, but there is a grave danger it could also be an
unwitting source of a terrorist attack on the United States—possibly
with weapons of mass destruction.

Our Commission has singled out Pakistan for special attention in
this report, as we believe it poses a serious challenge to America’s
short-term and medium-term national security interests. Indeed, many
government officials and outside experts believe that the next terrorist
attack against the United States is likely to originate from within the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. The Commission agrees. In terms of the nexus of proliferation and terrorism,
Pakistan must top the list of priorities for the next President and
Congress.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The next President and Congress
should implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan that
works with Pakistan and other countries to (1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, economic, and diplomatic
means; (2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan;

(3) counter and defeat extremist ideology; and (4) constrain a
nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.
xxiii

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