Text of the Report - p. 8

[johnkarls]

Appendices

tainability requirements for each site and establish timelines for the transfer of
financial responsibility; NNSA continues to seek, but has not received, commitments from Rosatom to increase funding for site- and national-level MPC&A
activities as part of the transition process.

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency

NNSA expects to complete the blending down of 500 metric tons of Russia’s
HEU by 2013. However, Russia has shown little interest in continuing the process beyond that amount, in part because it believes that it may be able to get a
better price for its downblended HEU from other countries. Legislation
recently proposed by Senator Pete Domenici would improve Russia’s access to
the U.S. market, on the condition that Moscow blend down additional HEU
beyond the 500 metric tons already agreed. The Commission believes that this
is a sensible approach.

Russian Plutonium Disposition

The September 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement
(PMDA) committed the United States and Russia to each dispose of 34 metric
tons of plutonium, but a number of obstacles slowed their progress. These
included a disagreement over the path for disposing of the material, the liability of contractors working in the Russian Federation, financing, and the lack of
a monitoring regime to provide confidence that the program would not lead to
proliferation.

Over time, most of these issues were resolved; in November 2007, the
United States and Russia agreed on a plan for Russia to dispose of the 34 metric
tons of its plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in Russia’s fast reactors—the
BN-600 and the BN-800, which is currently under construction. Russia has also
pledged to bear most of the cost and could begin disposing of its plutonium by
2012. Under this plan, the U.S. contribution is capped at $400 million. Both the
United States and Russia plan to complete disposition of all 68 metric tons of
plutonium between 2035 and 2040. This schedule, subject to congressional
funding, takes into account both the time needed to construct facilities in Russia
and the United States and the time needed to actually dispose of the material.

One unresolved issue concerns the establishment of a monitoring and
inspection regime. For years efforts have been made to negotiate such a
regime, but Russian concerns over transparency and access have prevented an
agreement from being reached.

Second Line of Defense

The Baker-Cutler report called for an increase in funding for the Second Line of
Defense (SLD) program because, in the task force’s judgment, the program was

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moving forward too slowly. In FY 2000, the program’s budget was $6 million; by
FY 2008, it was $267 million. In response to heightened concerns after 9/11, SLD
work in the FSU countries has steadily and consistently expanded to other countries. SLD’s Core Program installs radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports, primarily in Russia and the former Soviet
republics.

In 2006, the program reached an agreement with the Federal Customs
Service of Russia to equip all 350 Russian border crossings with radiation
detection equipment by the end of 2011. A total of 117 sites in Russia have
been equipped to date, and costs for this effort are shared by NNSA and the
Russian Customs Service. The Core Program has identified a total of 450 sites
where detection equipment will be installed. The Megaports Initiative,
launched in 2003, works with countries to equip seaports with radiation detection equipment. The program is operational in ports in 19 countries. Program
officials have identified 75 ports altogether for potential cooperation.

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
and Nuclear Cities Initiative

The Baker-Cutler report noted that the IPP suffered from years of inconsistent
funding from Congress, and that metrics, such as the number of actual
weapons scientists engaged in commercial jobs, were difficult to document.
The report emphasized that careful attention should be given to defining criteria for success and developing an exit strategy for the program.

In 2005, DOE established the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP): it combined the missions of the IPP and the NCI, which worked
with former scientists in Russia’s closed nuclear cities, and expanded the scientist engagement mission beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. GIPP
has engaged thousands of former weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians at more than 180 facilities in the former Soviet Union, as well as hundreds of former weapons specialists in Libya and Iraq.

GIPP coordinates closely with the Department of State’s Global Threat
Reduction (GTR) program, which also works with former FSU weapons scientists
and has expanded to include facilities in Iraq and Libya. As GIPP’s original mission has evolved, it has reduced the scope of its work in the FSU to focus on institutes deemed potentially vulnerable to targeted recruitment. However, the
program still has not developed a formal exit strategy.

Relevant Programs Initiated After the Baker-Cutler Report

Additional programs undertaken by DOE/NNSA consistent with Baker-
Cutler objectives include the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium
Production (EWGPP) program, which is replacing Russia’s last three

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plutonium-producing reactors with fossil fuel plants. Two of these reactors
have already been shut down, and the third is scheduled to close no later than
December 2010.

The Baker-Cutler report called for the return of HEU from Soviet-built
research reactors to Russia for downblending and disposition. This is being
accomplished through NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI),
which is working to convert U.S.- and Russian-built HEU-fueled research reactors around the world to less-proliferation-sensitive LEU and to repatriate the
HEU to its country of origin. To date, GTRI has helped return 764 kilograms of
Russian-origin HEU from reactors for blending down. This total includes 21
HEU shipments from Soviet-built research reactors in Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, Uzbekistan, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Vietnam. GTRI reports that it plans to remove or dispose of about
2,245 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from civilian sites by 2015.

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International
Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Treaties,
Regimes, and Initiatives


Treaties in Force

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
further the goal of achieving complete nuclear and general disarmament. It
entered into force on March 5, 1970, and has 188 members. Only India, Israel,
North Korea, and Pakistan are not members of the NPT.

The NPT establishes a safeguards system, which includes inspections of
civilian nuclear facilities, to monitor compliance with the treaty. This safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). In 1997, the IAEA adopted an Additional Protocol that, when ratified
by individual NPT members, gives the agency expanded safeguards authority
and greater access to verify nuclear declarations.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and
Toxin Weapons (BWC)


The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development,
production, acquisition, and retention of biological agents and toxins, weapons,
and specialized means of delivery. It entered into force on March 26, 1975.
There are currently 162 state parties to the BWC. Notable non-parties include
North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Israel.

Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

The CPPNM entered into force on February 7, 1987. It has 137 state parties.
The convention is the only international legally binding agreement on the
physical protection of nuclear material. An amendment to the convention
negotiated in 2005 will strengthen it by requiring state parties to protect
nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use and storage as well as
during transport. The amendment will enter into force following its ratification
by two-thirds of the state parties to the convention.

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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

START was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1991. It
limits long-range nuclear forces—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy
bombers—and contains complex verification provisions. In May 1992, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States signed a protocol naming all five parties to the treaty. START entered into force in December
31, 1994. It will expire on December 31, 2009, unless the parties agree to
extend it.

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“Moscow Treaty”)

The Moscow Treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and entered into force on
June 1, 2003. The treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce their
strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012,
at which time the treaty expires.

Treaties Negotiated but Not in Force

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. The CTBT has not entered into force. The provisions of the treaty
require the 44 states with nuclear reactors to ratify the treaty before it enters
into force. In October 1999, the U.S. Senate failed to give its consent to ratification of the treaty. Nevertheless, the United States is observing a unilateral
moratorium on nuclear tests.

Proposed Treaties

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

A proposal that the international community negotiate a ban on the production
of fissile material (plutonium and enriched uranium) that could be used in
nuclear weapons is on the long-term negotiating agenda at the United Nations
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Negotiations have been largely
stalled since 1993.

Nonproliferation Regimes

Zangger Committee

In 1971, a group of seven NPT nuclear supplier nations formed the Nuclear
Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee, to assist in restricting

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nuclear trade as called for in Article III of the NPT. In 1974, the Zangger Committee compiled a list of nuclear export items that could be potentially useful
for military applications and agreed that the transfer of items on the list would
trigger a requirement for IAEA safeguards to ensure that the items were not
used to make nuclear explosives.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

In 1975, the major nuclear suppliers formed the London Club, which is now
known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG is an informal group
of 45 nuclear supplier countries that seeks to halt proliferation of nuclear
weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear material and
technology exports.

Executive Agreements

HEU Purchase Agreement

Under the United States–Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase
Agreement, signed in 1993, 500 tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear
weapons is to be blended down to proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium
(LEU) by 2013. The United States Enrichment Corporation, a private corporation serving as executive agent for the HEU Purchase Agreement, purchases this
LEU and resells it to U.S. companies that use it as commercial nuclear reactor
fuel.

Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)

Under the PMDA, signed in September 2000, the United States and Russia
each agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. A series
of disagreements were settled in a follow-on agreement in November 2007,
with an overall understanding to complete the disposition of 68 metric tons
total of plutonium between 2035 and 2040.

Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Initiatives

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The PSI was launched in 2003 to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. As of October 2008, 92 nations have formally
committed to PSI participation as partner states.

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Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

The GICNT was launched by the United States and Russia on July 15, 2006, to
expand and accelerate the development of their partnership capacity to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. The GICNT is open to other partner
nations, which currently number 75.

Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative

President Vladimir Putin and President George W. Bush agreed to this initiative
on nuclear security cooperation at a February 2005 summit in Bratislava, the
Republic of Slovakia. The Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative is focused on five
key areas: emergency response cooperation, sharing best practices to promote
nuclear security, enhancing nuclear security cultures in both countries, research
reactor conversion and fuel return, and promoting the implementation of
UNSCR 1540. A senior U.S.-Russia group chaired by the U.S. Secretary of
Energy and the Director of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) oversees this work and provides progress reports to the Presidents every six months.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

UNSCR 1540 is a 2004 resolution that establishes binding obligations on all
UN member states to take and enforce measures against WMD proliferation,
such as developing the laws and regulations they need to criminalize proliferation, improving physical protection and safeguards at nuclear facilities,
strengthening export controls, and developing a robust security culture
focused on reducing the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials or technology.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMI American Media International

BSL Biosafety Level

BW Biological Weapons

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CP counterproliferation

CPPNM Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

CSI Container Security Initiative

CT counterterrorism

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTR cooperative threat reduction

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DOE Department of Energy

EU European Union

EWGPP Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

FSU former Soviet Union

G-8 Group of Eight

GAO Government Accountability Office

GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

GIPP Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste
pour la Prédication et le Combat)

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative

HEU highly enriched uranium

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HSC Homeland Security Council

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

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IHR International Health Regulations

INFCIRC Information Circular

IPP Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention

LEU low-enriched uranium

MOX mixed oxide

MPC&A Material Protection, Control and Accounting

NCI Nuclear Cities Initiative

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NPT Nonproliferation Treaty

NSC National Security Council

NWFP North-West Frontier Province

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OIE World Organization for Animal Health (formerly known
as the Office international des épizooties)

PCC Policy Coordinating Committee

PMDA Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

Rosatom [Russian] Federal Atomic Energy Agency

SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLD Second Line of Defense

SNM special nuclear material

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

WHO World Health Organization

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Commissioner Biographies

Senator Bob Graham, Commission Chairman, is a former two–term governor
of Florida and served for 18 years in the United States Senate. This is combined
with 12 years in the Florida legislature for a total of 38 years of public service. In
the Senate, he served on the Select Committee on Intelligence—including
eighteen months as chairman in 2001–2002. During this time, he served as cochairman of the joint House-Senate inquiry of the events surrounding the September 11th attacks. Following the release of the Joint Inquiry’s final report in
July 2003, Senator Graham steadfastly advocated reform of the intelligence
community and sponsored legislation to bring about needed changes. Based on
these experiences, he authored Intelligence Matters.

After retiring from the Senate in 2004, Senator Graham served for a year as a
senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. His primary focus
was on civic education and intelligence. While there, he commenced research
and writing a book, to be published early 2009, entitled America, The Owner’s
Manual. He has established a Center for Public Service at the University of
Florida and the University of Miami, which primarily focuses on participatory citizenship, homeland security and the Americas. He received his bachelors degree
from the University of Florida and his law degree from Harvard Law School.

Senator Jim Talent, Commission Vice-Chairman, was elected at the age of 28
to the Missouri House of Representatives, where he served for eight years,
beginning in 1984. At the age of 32, Senator Talent was unanimously chosen by
his colleagues to be the Minority Leader, the highest-ranking Republican leadership position in the Missouri House. He served in that capacity until 1992,
when he was elected to Congress to represent Missouri’s Second District; he
served in the House until 2001.

While in the House, Senator Talent served for eight years on the House
Armed Services Committee. In 2002, Missourians elected Talent to the United
States Senate, where he served until 2007. During that time, he served as the
Chairman of the Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee.

Currently, Senator Talent serves as a Distinguished Fellow at the Washington, D.C.–based Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness
issues and welfare reform. Senator Talent received his bachelor’s degree from
Washington University in St. Louis, where he received the Arnold J. Lien Prize as
the most outstanding undergraduate in political science. He graduated Order of
the Coif from the University of Chicago Law School in 1981 and clerked for Judge
Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals from 1982 through 1983.

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Appendices

Graham Allison is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Allison’s most recent book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, is now in its third printing and was
selected by the New York Times as one of the “100 most notable books of 2004.”

From 1977 to 1989, Dr. Allison served as Dean of the Kennedy School.
Under his leadership, a small, undefined program grew twentyfold to become
a major professional school of public policy and government.

From 1985 to 1987, Dr. Allison served as Special Advisor to the Secretary
of Defense; from 1993 to 1994, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and
Plans. He has the sole distinction of having twice been awarded the Defense
Department’s highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal,
first by Secretary Casper Weinberger and then by Secretary William Perry.

Dr. Allison has authored or co-authored 20 books and hundreds of articles.
He has been a member of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Policy Board for
Secretaries Weinberger, Carlucci, Cheney, Aspin, Perry, and Cohen. He was a
founding member of the Trilateral Commission, was a Director of the Council
on Foreign Relations, and has been a member of many public committees and
commissions. He was educated at Davidson College, and he earned a B.A. in
history at Harvard College; B.A. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics, and
economics at Oxford University; and his Ph.D. at Harvard University.

Robin Cleveland currently serves as a Principal with Olivet Consulting LLC.
Previously, she has served as the Counselor to the President of the World
Bank, Associate Director at the White House Office of Management and Budget, and in a variety of key positions with Senator Mitch McConnell on the
Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
Senate Appropriations Committee.

Ms. Cleveland co-led efforts to develop two presidential initiatives, the
Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief, undertakings that reflect her experience linking policy, performance, and resource management. Ms. Cleveland graduated from Wesleyan
University with honors.

Stephen G. Rademaker became Senior Counsel to BGR Holding LLC in
January 2007. He continues to serve as the U.S. representative on the UN
Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, a position he
has held since 2003.

Mr. Rademaker came to BGR Holding from the staff of Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist, where he served as Policy Director for National Security
Affairs and Senior Counsel.

In 2002, Mr. Rademaker was confirmed by the Senate as an Assistant Secretary of State, and from then until 2006 he headed at various times three

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bureaus of the Department of State, including the Bureau of Arms Control
and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. He directed
nonproliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Immediately prior to joining the Department of State, Rademaker was
Chief Counsel to the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S.
House of Representatives, where he was responsible for drafting the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. Rademaker has also held positions on the staff of the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, including Deputy
Staff Director and Chief Counsel.

From 1992 to 1993, Mr. Rademaker served as General Counsel of the
Peace Corps. He returned briefly to the agency in 2000–2001 as the Bush-
Cheney transition’s Director of Transition for the Peace Corps.

Mr. Rademaker received three degrees from the University of Virginia: a

B.A. with Highest Distinction in 1981, a J.D. in 1984, and an M.A. in foreign
affairs in 1985. While at the University of Virginia he was made a member of
Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif.
Congressman Timothy J. Roemer served in the U.S. House from 1991 to
2003. After the attacks of September 11, Mr. Roemer used his position on the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to support the work of a
joint congressional inquiry into the attacks. Mr. Roemer also was the key sponsor of legislation to establish the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission. He went on to
serve as a member of the 9/11 Commission.

Since leaving Congress in 2003, Mr. Roemer has continued to work on
developing ways to strengthen national security as President of the Center for
National Policy and as a Distinguished Scholar at the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University.

Prior to his elected service, Mr. Roemer served on the staffs of Representative John Brademas of Indiana (1978–1979) and Senator Dennis DeConcini
of Arizona (1985–1989).

He holds a Ph.D. in American government from the University of Notre
Dame. Mr. Roemer also earned his M.A. from Notre Dame and received his

B.A. from the University of California, San Diego.
Wendy R. Sherman is a Principal of The Albright Group LLC, a global strategy firm, and of Albright Capital Management LLC, an investment advisory
firm focused on emerging markets.

During the Clinton administration, Ambassador Sherman served as
Counselor and chief troubleshooter for the State Department, as well as Special Advisor to President Clinton and Policy Coordinator on North Korea.

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She serves on the Board of Directors of Oxfam America and the Board of
Advisors for the Center for a New American Security, and is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Strategy Group. She is also a
member of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue and a regular participant in the
Australian American Leadership Dialogue. Ambassador Sherman attended
Smith College, and she earned a B.A. cum laude from Boston University and a
master’s in social work, Phi Kappa Phi, from the University of Maryland.

Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center. From 1989 to 1993, Sokolski served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and received the Secretary of Defense’s Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to that
appointment, Mr. Sokolski worked in the Secretary’s Office of Net Assessment
on proliferation issues.

From 1984 to 1988, Mr. Sokolski served as Senior Military Legislative
Aide to Senator Dan Quayle; from 1982 through 1983, he served as Special
Assistant on Nuclear Energy Matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey.

Mr. Sokolski also served as a consultant on proliferation issues to the intelligence community’s National Intelligence Council. After his work in the Pentagon,
Mr. Sokolski received a congressional appointment to the Deutch Proliferation
Commission, which completed its work in 1999. He also served as a member of
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Panel from 1995 to 1996.

Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited numerous works on proliferation-
related issues, including Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation. He attended the University of Southern California
and Pomona College, received his graduate education at the University of
Chicago, and currently teaches nuclear proliferation issues at the Institute of
World Politics in Washington, D.C.

Rich Verma is a partner at the law firm of Steptoe & Johnson LLP, where he
practices international law and is also a member of the firm’s government
affairs practice. Most recently, Mr. Verma served as Senior National Security
Advisor to the Senate Majority Leader, a position he held for several years.
Mr. Verma also worked as Senior Counsel and Policy Director for the Senate
Whip and served on the staff of Congressman John P. Murtha.

Mr. Verma is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force and a former country director
for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. He holds
degrees from the Georgetown University Law Center, American University’s
Washington College of Law, and Lehigh University. He is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations, was formerly an International Affairs Fellow of
the Council, and has served on the National Academy of Sciences Panel on
Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Law.

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Commission Staff

Evelyn N. Farkas, Executive Director
Eric K. Fanning, Deputy Director
Raj De, General Counsel


Amir M. Abdmishani Erin R. Mahan

Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member

Georgia A. Adams Maurice A. Mallin

Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member

Amy A. Berg David E. McCracken

Staff Assistant Professional Staff Member

Jennifer C. Boone Jamison D. Pirko

Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant

Sylvia Boone Neal A. Pollard

Administrative Officer Director for Counterterrorism

Robert DiNardo Don A. Puglisi

Professional Staff Member Professional Staff Member

Andrew B. Duberstein William R. Reed

Intern Professional Staff Member

Alice Falk Constance T. Rybka

Editor Copyeditor Chief of Security

Thomas W. Graham Martin Schram

Professional Staff Member Consultant

Stephen G. Heil Wade R. Sharp

Professional Staff Member Security Officer

Joseph Helman Jonathan B. Tucker

Director for Intelligence Professional Staff Member

Adam J. Jones Jenee B. Tyler

Professional Staff Writer Intern

Abraham C. Kanter Adam K. VanDervort

Staff Assistant Professional Staff Member

Sam E. Kessler Kenneth D. Ward

Special Assistant to the Executive Director Professional Staff Member

George W. Look

Director for Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation

132